Jun
17
Advice on introducing change
Filed Under Juran 101 | Leave a Comment
1) Those that propose changes must understand that the premises on which they base their proposals are merely products of the culture in which the expert happened to be reared. They are not necessarily universal truths. For perspective that no one cares, for example, how they did it at Motorola or GE.
2) The culture of leadership, at any level, serves them well by providing them with precedent, practices, and explanations. These things, however unenlightened, have the advantage of predictability and thus assure, to some degree, peace of mind. The better that the change agent understands this; the better they will be able to sell their ideas. Remember that complaining about the people you are trying to change or going over their heads will not secure their cooperation.
3) The change agent should examine their proposal from the viewpoint of the leadership that will implement the changes, since that is what the latter is bound to do anyway. The change agent will not have to live with changes, understand the point of view of those that will.
4) We must be careful to avoid dealing with a localized problem with a sweeping master plan, which goes far beyond the immediate needs. The risk is losing the entire proposal including the solution to the localized problem. The classic example is to automate a workflow when the primary issue is communication between two departments.
5) Unless the local leadership is convinced that the change should be made, they are likely to return to their old ways rather than endure the tension of frustration brought about by the change. Remember that the safest choice is to not risk status or position.
6) Secure active participation of those that will be affected, both in the planning and in the execution of the plan. They have the best process knowledge and they have to live with the changes – you don’t have either.
7) Timing –
a. Provide sufficient time for the mental changes to take place. This is a well-understood principle to politicians.
b. Start small and keep it fluid. To protect against the unexpected.
c. No surprises. Remember that the number 1 defining characteristic of a culture is predictability.
d. Choose the right time. Look at the other things going on around your change, there is a limit to an organizations ability to absorb.
The planning should include participation not only by the advocates and by those who will be affected; the planning should also include third parties who can supply balance and objectivity. Third parties can also give good insight into group dynamics.
9) Strip off all technical cultural baggage not strictly needed for introducing the change. Two easy examples – people don’t need to study Shewhart to implement a control chart; people don’t have to use Japanese words to institute process discipline.
10) Work with the recognized leadership of the culture. Informal structures cannot be overlooked.
11) Treat people with dignity. Remember the Hawthorne experiments.
12) Put your self into the other person’s place. The other person’s point of view is not derived from your point of view – take the time to understand theirs.
13) Make use of the wide variety of methods available for dealing with resistance to change.
a. Try persuasion.
b. Change the environment in a way that makes it easy for the individual to adjust their point of view.
c. Remedy the causes of resistance – understanding the person’s communication style and motivating drives will go a long way on this one.
d. Create a social climate that favors the new habits.
14) Forget it – always an option, make sure projects don’t just become about winning. Remember the definition of fanaticism – “redoubling your efforts when the original objective has been forgotten.”
Paraphrased and elaborated upon from Juran’s Managerial Breakthrough, 1964. It’s worth the read.
Gary
May
11
I’ve been reading Juran lately – for the first time in probably 10 years. Not unusual, I read him a lot in the late 70’s and then again in the mid to late 80’s. He is the basis of the Six Sigma “breakthrough” roadmap – it is from his 1964 book Managerial Breakthrough and from his videotape series “Juran on Quality Improvement” from the late 70’s - early 80’s. He is also the source of many of the “Six Sigma” materials. Just to clarify, he was very clear he got his ideas from elsewhere as well, he just remembered to tell people where.
He wrote an article in July 1955 for the publication Industrial Quality Control that, except for his phrasing and bias towards assuming all workers are men, is relevant and great advice today.
At a gathering of Quality Managers, a young executive was eagerly relating how they had reduced waste in his company, how through quality control they had discovered new things about the process, and how the production superintendent had taken action.
One of the listeners shrugged his shoulders.
“In my company you wouldn’t get to first base with that, and all because of Emil.”
Emil, it turned out, was an “old-time” production superintendent. Emil was set in his ways. Nothing could make him change. And the management was just too softhearted to take Emil off the job because he had 31 years’ service, and had been on his job for 13 years. Emil still had six years to go for retirement. Until then, no progress was possible.
Then a curious thing happened. Another listener interrupted.
“One of our superintendents is just like that – only his name is Charlie.” Then followed a whole chorus of interruptions. Everyone, it seemed, knew in his own company a superintendent, a manager, or a foreman that fitted the description of Emil.
So Emil is everywhere, only his name is something else. But for the quality control man, is this fate or a problem? Is no progress possible, or is the need to find a solution which fits Emil?
I have met Emil in many plants. From him, from his bosses, from his associates, and from his subordinates. I have learned much about him and his attitudes, including his attitude toward quality.
Curiously enough, Emil would rather make good products than bad ones. He likes to have said of him that “Emil does a good job.” Emil would rather have a high rate of yield than a low rate, because then he can make his delivery schedules easier. Emil would rather have his men make high earnings than lose those earnings in rework. I have never met a good production head named Emil or any otherwise who preferred bad work to good work.
The Emils I have met have some other things in common. Out of a long career with the company they can recall many pleasant memories but also some bitter ones. Here and there they have endured an uninspiring boss, a siege of unwarranted blame, or a piece of skullduggery from some industrial adventurer who tried to rush through in two months what takes a year or two to mature.
Emil looks to those experiences for much guidance to meet the problems ahead. He is getting on in years and he is slowing up. No longer does he consider it a calamity if he is passed up for promotion. But it would be a real calamity if he should be blamed for some big failure, and risk losing the status he already has.
It took Emil many years to become a superintendent. Most of the fellows he started with are still on the machine or on the bench. In their eyes, and in his own eyes, he has arrived.
Emil is reconciled to the idea that he will probably never get to be manager. Younger fellows have already passed him up in enough numbers to make this clear. The big thing, for Emil, is not to lose his job as superintendent. The younger superintendents are of a different mind. The last thing they want is to remain a superintendent all their life. They can afford to gamble and take chances with new ways. But Emil is too far along in years and in service to dare to gamble.
So Emil uses the utmost caution to protect his flank. His security is not threatened one bit by the usual day-to-day fires he must put out. He has been doing that for many years, and knows how to cope with the day-to-day problems. Any threat to his security will not come from these familiar problems, but from something which is unfamiliar and untried.
This brings us to the heart of the problem of dealing with this “obstructionist.” Emil is going to “obstruct” whatever is a threat to his security. He would not be human if he acted otherwise. The problem of dealing with Emil is “simply” to avoid a threat to Emil’s security.
For some engineers this is all wrong. They are advocating something that is so logical (to them) and so valuable to the company (in their opinion). Why should this not be adopted forthwith? Why is it necessary to act out a game with Emil, to cater to his whims, to make it seem that it is really his ideas which are being put into effect?
In particular the engineers reproach their own top management. Emil, they say, should be ordered to put these new ideas into effect. Yet this suggestion by the engineers betrays shocking ignorance of the fundamental rules of the organization. If top management is to hold Emil responsible for results, it must give him collateral authority to decide to act. To order him to adopt this or that new proposal would be taking away with the left hand the authority top management gave Emil with its right hand.
So there is no escape from selling Emil himself on the ideas. If the engineers could only grasp this fact! Once they put their minds to it, they could discovery many devices for selling; in fact, they could borrow them intact from other heads in their own company. If they make their first job that of convincing Emil that they are no threat to his security, they have crossed the real barrier.
My own rule for judging whether Emil is going to be a problem is to discover whether Emil has (a) integrity, and (b) common sense. If these are present, the limitations on results lie only in the sales ability of the engineers.
Well said Dr. Juran.
Gary